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I.

Introduction

In 2012, the Texas Supreme Court held that a state law imposing a cap
on groundwater pumping, and denying all but a small domestic allotment to
overlying landowners who had not pumped previously, was effectively a
constitutional taking of the non-pumping landowner’s property in the
groundwater under its land.1 The decision has been widely noted and
sharply criticized on two related grounds: first, the view that there is an
extant property right in un-pumped groundwater beneath one’s land; and
second, that since Texas follows the rule-of-capture—under which any
overlying owner can have as much water as it can pump, without any
responsibility to other owners overlying the same aquifer—it seems
anomalous to say that landowners have a vested property right in water they
might never have been able to obtain and use, even in the absence of any
government restrictions on pumping.2
Texas is well known for having its own distinctive take on many legal
issues, so the Day case will likely be of little importance as a precedent in
western groundwater law. But the court’s opinion also raised an issue that
could turn out to be very instructive for understanding a category of
regulatory takings cases that have long troubled the courts.
Very briefly stated, the facts in Day were this: in response to
Endangered Species Act problems created by heavy pumping of the aquifer,
Texas enacted a statute that imposed limits on extractions, allocating the
great bulk of the allowable pumping to existing users, with a small
allocation, largely for domestic use, available to overlying landowners who
*
1.
2012.

University of California, Berkeley.
Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012), reh’g denied, June 8,

2. E.g., Gerald R. Torres, Liquid Assets: Groundwater in Texas, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE
143 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/12/4/torres.html.
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had not historically pumped from the aquifer. In responding to a takings
claim by one of those non-pumpers, the court held that the plaintiff had a
property right in unpumped water under his land, and without quantifying
that right, opined that the statute had likely deprived such owners of their
“fair share” of the aquifer’s water, and thus constituted a regulatory taking
under the Penn Central standard set out by the U.S. Supreme Court.3
Such a statute would have been very unusual indeed if it had not
“grandfathered” established uses at the expense of prospective users. And
therein lies the real interest of the Texas decision for regulatory takings
doctrine: the notion of a proprietary “fair share” entitlement to a resource
that could have been accessed from one’s land, but that was available to
other landowners as well and—under a legitimate regulatory law—has
reached its use limits. The “fair share” concept suggests the usefulness of
thinking about some regulatory takings disputes not simply in terms of the
impact of government regulation on the regulated claimant, but the way the
total entitlement to use of the resource in question had been allocated
among all the original owners who equally shared it.
That is not the way fairness has been approached in takings cases4 or
in the literature.5 From a “fair share” perspective, a question worth asking is
why it turns out that all the burden of restricted use ends up falling on only
one or a few owners—late developers, as in the Texas case—rather than
being shared in some more equitable way by all the owners who have
utilized the resource, and have created the problem that has generated the
regulation.
This dilemma arises with what are usually known as common pool
resources,6 where a number of individuals have unlimited access and
entitlement to use (and use up) the resource, and where at some point that
utilization burdens the resource in an unacceptable way. An unmanaged
rule-of-capture aquifer is obviously such a resource, as it is physically and
legally available to all overlying owners, and at some point of exploitation it
loses its capacity to sustain long-term use. But quite a few controversial

3. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 843. See generally Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
4. “Fairness” as between the owner and government has long been a central
concern in takings cases. Virtually, every Supreme Court opinion quotes Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), saying it is inequitable to force “some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.”
5.

See, e.g., infra notes 7, 8.

6. See S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & R.C. Bishop, “‘Common Property’ as a Concept in
Natural Resource Policy,” 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713 (1975).
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regulatory takings situations have that same quality, and could also be
analyzed in terms of the “fair share” of those owners who share legal access
to it and can collectively use it up. It is worth considering some familiar
regulatory situations with this perspective in mind.
That land use regulation often seems unfair because it “transfer[s]
wealth from one class of people, owners of undeveloped land, to another
class of people, owners of already existing houses” has been noticed and
well documented.7 The common conclusions drawn from this observation
are (1) that selfish residents (owners of developed land) are using
government to advantage themselves at the expense of future residents; (2)
that it increases housing prices by limiting land use; and (3) that such
governmentally generated unfairness that should be treated as a
compensable taking of property.8
The question I explore here is why we don’t have more of a “fair share”
property system in common pool resources, the absence of which leads to
fairness issues when regulation occurs.

II.

Our Non-Fair-Share Legal System

A particularly instructive example is Agins v. Tiburon,9 an open space
downzoning case. After some years of dense development on very valuable
land at the edge of San Francisco Bay, the city of Tiburon determined that it
was running out of open space, and it re-zoned the relatively few remaining
undeveloped tracts for very low-density development (one to five acres per
home). Agins claimed a taking, noting the loss in value he would sustain
from the downzoning. The taking issue was never decided because there
had been no determination as to how density limitation would in fact be
implemented. The case nonetheless provides an interesting setting in which
to think about “fair share” property rights.
Open space in Tiburon can be seen as analogous to the aquifer in the
Day case. At the outset, it is a resource that overlies (rather than underlies)
each landowner’s tract. While open space is unlike groundwater in that the
quantum of each owner’s ability to appropriate is bounded by his tract, it
parallels the groundwater situation in that a subset of the total owners can
exhaust the available supply in a way that does not equally reflect each
owner’s acreage (or some other measure of “fair share”). While each owner
can only appropriate open space on his own land, what each owner does on

7. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW ECONOMICS,
(1995).

AND

POLITICS 251

8. E.g., Carol Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1125, 1150
(1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS
(1995).
9.

Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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that land diminishes a benefit shared by all owners. That benefit, remaining
open space, is analogous to the shared benefit of a sustainable groundwater
supply.
In addition, as in the groundwater case, the lawfully available supply is
determined not at the outset, but at some later stage in the developmental
process. Also, as under the Texas law in the Day case, all the owners who
had built on their land before the downzoning are permitted to keep the
private benefit of the open space they have used up; and only a quite small
amount of usable open space legally remains for those holding undeveloped
tracts.
The open space case differs from the groundwater case in that there is
no practical way for the owners of existing houses to cut back their existing
open space consumption in favor of those who haven’t built. But that does
not diminish the claim that the available open space was not fairly allocated
among all landowners at a much earlier stage. There are devices for such
allocation in various settings, such as tradable emission rights in air
pollution regulation, and transferable development rights in land use law.
Agins is only one example of this species of highly controversial
common pool regulatory takings cases. Unlike many conventional cases
where a regulated owner wants to do something different from his
neighbors—e.g., put a commercial facility or an apartment house in a single
family neighborhood—Agins-type cases provoke fairness claims because the
owner only wants to do what his neighbors have already done. The same is
true in wetlands and endangered species cases where only a few owners
hold all remaining viable habitat.10 It is also the situation in many
conventional settings: for example, in air pollution regulation where new
sources have to meet a higher standard than existing ones,11 and in routine
urban downzoning cases, where existing density of development has created
congestion, straining road and public transport capacities.
All such cases bear a relation to the Texas case—and indeed to
groundwater cases generally—where use of numerous individuals’ tracts
exhausts some resource value common to a larger population, such as a
sustainable water supply, open space, freedom from congestion, habitat, or
air quality. Whenever such cases arise, and laws address the exhaustion/

10. The problem is exacerbated in some Endangered Species Act water cases
where only one user bears the burden of restoring flows to avoid jeopardy because
the United States prefers to use § 7 (16 U.S.C. § 1536) rather than § 9 (16 U.S.C. §
1538) of the Act. Use of the latter provision would permit action against all those
whose diversions contribute to the “take” of an endangered species. See HOLLY
DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH BASIN 92 (2008). See also Pac.
Coast Fed. of Fishermens’ Assn.’s v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 1093 (9th Cir.
2005).
11.
360
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sustainability problem, the affected owners are likely to perceive the
regulation not as unjustified, or even as necessarily economically excessive,
but as unfair vis-à-vis their neighbors. In such cases, the claimants do not
usually prevail unless their economic loss is very severe.12 The common
response is that laws inevitably change over time and an owner cannot
reasonably expect that use rights will remain static while circumstances,
such as urbanization, new knowledge, and changed public values evolve.
My purpose here is not to rehash the debate over how much property
owners ought to be required to adapt to new public values, as compared
with new versions of established values (the so-called nuisance exception),
but rather to point out something about such disputes that has gone
virtually unremarked in takings debates, either by property rights
proponents or their adversaries.
It is this: as contrasted with the view expressed by the Texas court in
the Day case, regulatory takings debates have never revolved around the
idea that property law should assign a “fair share” of the right to exhaust the
capacity of resource in question to each of the owners who have the ability
to exhaust it. Consequently, regulatory laws burdening only late developers
have not been challenged on the ground that they deprived those owners of
their fair share of the resource in question. The Texas case is extremely
unusual in basing its takings analysis on that theory.
The question is an interesting one. Why isn’t someone like Agins
entitled to some fair share of the available open space? If he is, isn’t his
complaint against his neighbors or against laws that allow them to use more
than their fair share? In the Agins situation, a claim against the City of
Tiburon would probably be a pretty good proxy for the neighbors who used
up open space. But in many cases—wetlands, endangered species, and air
pollution, for example—there is no practical way to identify those who had
exhausted the resource in question.
Another difficulty with a fair share theory of ownership is that it works
best when established at an early stage in the developmental process. The
earlier the regulation, the more there is reciprocity of benefit and burden
among owners, which is one of the hallmarks of fairness. Part of the
problem is simply our ability to see the future clearly. For many resources
we don’t know what the limits of sustainability or public tolerance are (or
will be) until we know more and/or have begun to experience problems.
That is most dramatically illustrated by wetlands, where over many decades
we moved from subsidizing the filling of such “wasteland” to lamenting the
loss of a “precious natural heritage.”

12. Under the dominant Penn Central standard, one of the three controlling
factors is “the economic impact of the regulation on the [landowner].” 438 U.S. at
124; and total, or near total, economic loss is the determining factor under the per se
standard in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1016, n.7 (1992).
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In addition, circumstances change, urbanization having brought
acceptance of numerous land use regulations that would have seemed
oppressive in less densely developed places. Technology also plays an
important role. Before electrification easements of light were important to
landowners. Then they became unnecessary. And now solar power has
revived them as an issue.
Societal values also change across a spectrum from trivial to
fundamental: racially restrictive covenants were once standard restrictions
on landowner’s transactions rights. Sunday closing laws were once
pervasive. Billboards have their day and then become obtrusive. Climate
change modifies views about entitlements to coastal development that may
ultimately burden the community if sea levels rise significantly.
Moreover, and perhaps at least equally significant, property owners
tend to resist early establishment of constraints on development (a/k/a
government planning), partly out of suspicion of government and partly
from a preference to maintain as much private initiative as possible in
shaping the landscape, and to allow consumer preferences to reveal
themselves.
As the system now functions, early developers benefit from burdening
resource capacity, but bear no costs when limits on that capacity are
subsequently imposed. And except in cases of extreme economic loss, late
developers get no compensation.13 The ultimate fairness issues in such
cases are undoubtedly various. Surely some owners are caught up in fastchanging circumstances beyond their control or anticipation. Other late
developers no doubt take a calculated risk that a potential for greater profit
as available land diminishes is worth the possibility that new restrictions
will obliterate that opportunity. That must be the case with professional
wetlands developers who continue to purchase such lands despite decades
of ever-increasing and always-changing restrictive rules, but where such
lands are often the only remaining open lands in highly developed areas.
Whatever the facts in any specific case, decades of regulatory takings
law makes clear—even during eras when the U.S. Supreme Court majority is
strongly protective of property rights—that no concept of “fair share”
determines the outcome of Agins-type regulatory takings cases.14 The “fair

13. As noted at note 30, infra, mitigating strategies such as transferable
development rights are sometimes available.
14. The underlying facts in Tahoe-Sierra are often cited by property rights
advocates as an example: Wealthy second-home owners created the water quality
problem, and subsequently development restraints were imposed that largely impact
small tract owners. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302 (2002).
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share” rationale underlying the Texas decision in the Day case is thus
profoundly at odds with American regulatory takings law.15

III.

Our Prior Appropriation Property System

What, then, is the theory that underlies our takings jurisprudence in
Agins-like settings? The answer, I believe, is a version of what western water
law calls prior appropriation. The water in a western river can be taken up
and used by appropriators until its legally available capacity is exhausted.
The conventional statement of the theory is “first in time is first in right.”
Those who are late to develop may find there is nothing left for them either
because the source is physically exhausted or because some water has been
reserved to protect instream uses.
While western river use rights do not arise from landownership,16 the
same prior appropriation system now also applies to groundwater in most
western states.17 My point, however, is not to draw a precise analogy from

Another example is water pollution, where lax non-point-source standards result in
the imposition of higher standards on point sources. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)
(§303(d)).
15. The unitization system in oil and gas on which the Texas court relies did
not arise as a property rights theory, but is the product of legislation enacted at a
time when oil was overabundant and excess production by competing overlying
owners was driving prices down. See Bruce M. Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and
Unitization: State Options in Dealing with Uncooperative Owners, 7 J. ENERGY L. & POL’Y 255,
257 (1986); Richard H. Leach, The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact, A Study in Success, 10
OKLA. L. REV. 274, 274-75 (1957).
16. The standard view in appropriation doctrine is that water belongs to the
public, subject to the acquisition of private usufructuary rights. E.g., Cal. Water Code
§ 102.
17. Not in Texas, obviously. A few remnants of riparianism remain elsewhere
in the West, primarily in California, where groundwater law as to non-using overlying
owners is still unresolved. Even there the courts have acknowledged that the
unexercised groundwater right of an overlying owner “if recognized, would “inhibit[]
long-range planning and investment . . . and foster[] costly and piecemeal litigation.”
Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 174 Cal. App. 3d 74, 86, 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 748-49 (1985).
Such claims, the court said, are “unrecorded, of unknown quantity, with little
opportunity for control in the public interest, and wasteful to the extent it deters
others from using water for fear of its ultimate exercise.” Id. Nonetheless, courts
have not yet barred such claims in over-appropriated basins, though in a number of
Southern California aquifers where negotiated settlements have been effectuated,
sustainable water allocations have effectively been allocated pro rata to existing
users. See WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS: GOVERNING GROUNDWATER IN
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (1992).
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western water law doctrine, but simply to point to the terms and practice it
employs to describe the way rights in exhaustible resources like open space
and clean air and density control actually work in practice.
It is immaterial whether the point of beginning is public ownership
(rivers), non-ownership (air) or conventional ownership (land).
The
important point is the allocation of entitlement to the use of such resources
among the various parties that have legal access to them. Even if one
begins with the view that every landowner “owns” the open space or the
congestion potential implicit in his land, so does every other landowner who
can impact openness and congestion within the relevant area. If the
governing authority has the right to limit those impacts to any extent at all
without paying compensation (and that is the existing law), the crucial
question is not whether there are property rights in those uses, but how the
rights are shared among those owners.
In practice, prior appropriation governs resource use generally,
operating to benefit early users at the expense of later users, even though
that terminology is not used outside the water context. Even in the East,
where water was traditionally considered abundant, and where riparian
doctrine imports a correlative rights (sharing) principle, the fair share idea
exists more in theory than in practice once shortages appear.18 Existing uses
(as long as not wasteful) are given a strong preference. For example,
Florida’s permit system requires an applicant to demonstrate that his
proposed use “will not interfere with any presently existing legal use of
water.”19 Protection of existing uses is also an explicit element of
reasonableness in water use under the Restatement (Second) of Torts.20

18. This may be more the case now than it was in the past, and may reflect
response to increasing scarcity. See, e.g., Martin v. Bigelow, 2 Aik. 184 (S.Ct. Vt.,
1827), though even then priority was strongly urged as a defense to sharing.
19. E.g., Fla. Stat. § 373.223(b) (2010). However, where we now have “managed
riparianism,” effectively a permit system, permit grants can be limited in duration so
that future re-allocations can be made. See Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 575 So. 2d
1324 (Fla. App., 2d Dist. 1991). Under western appropriation state permit systems, as
in California, permits are perpetual, though waste and unreasonable uses can be
(and are, though rarely) prohibited. See Water Code §275.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A(h) (1979). The Restatement also
speaks of “the proprietor’s reasonable share of the annual supply or total store of
ground water,” § 858(1)(b), but there appear to be few if any cases implementing that
principle. Oklahoma seems to be alone is allowing overlying owners to receive fixed
allocations based on percentage of overlying land (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 82, § 1020.9
(West 2012)), and in holding it unconstitutional to convert from a riparian to a prior
appropriation system, abolishing unused rights, which other western states have
done. Contrast Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla.
1990), with the general view in the west allowing abolition of riparian rights in favor
364
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Prior use is also operatively the governing standard in California’s
mixed appropriation/riparian system.21 In fact, as far as I have been able to
determine nationwide, instances in which existing non-wasteful water uses
must cut back to provide latecomers with a ‘fair share’ are extremely rare.22
A version of prior appropriation, though not in name, dominates even
riparian practice.
The reason seems clear enough. The legal system is highly averse to
disappointing expectations based on existing use and existing investment.23
That is why existing uses are almost always grandfathered when new and
more stringent regulations come into play (absent some exigent threat, such
as a health hazard).24 Indeed, retroactive impositions on established
property rights raise constitutional questions of their own.25
Land use regulation is the most familiar example of restrictions such
as new density or height zoning being imposed only for the future.26 Even
new building code restrictions are routinely imposed only when existing

of appropriation, e.g., In re Hood River, 114 Ore. 112, 227 Pac. 1065 (1924); Knight v.
Grimes, 80 S.D. 517, 127 N.W.2d 708 (1964). The problem of shifting from a riparian
to a permit system is explored in the Commentary to § 6R-1-03 of the Regulated
Riparian Model Water Code (1997). The Code respects existing withdrawals, and
provides a method for allocating among existing users if total pumping needs to be
reduced, § 6R-1-03(5). Non-users get nothing in such circumstances until the initial
permits expire.
21. In several old California cases the courts have protected existing surface
stream users against subsequent interfering pumping of tributary water (surface
riparian v. groundwater overlying owner): see Eckel v. Springfield Tunnel & Dev. Co.,
87 Cal. App. 617, 262 P. 425 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1927); McClintock v. Hudson, 141 Cal.
275, 74 P. 849 (1903); Miller v. Bay Cities Water Co., 157 Cal. 256, 107 P. 115 (1910).
And in City of Lodi v. East Bay M.U.D., the Court protected a prior appropriator of
percolating groundwater against a subsequent appropriator of surface stream water,
7 Cal. 2d 316, 60 P.2d 439 (1936).
22.

But not unheard of, see supra notes 20 and 21.

23. Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulation, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222 (2009).
24. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 5.78, nn.4, 5 (5th ed., 2003, cum.
Supp. 2011).
25.

See Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528-29 (1998).

26. The general rule is that municipalities may not zone retroactively to
terminate a nonconforming use, Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (Cal.
1930), and for obvious reasons, as noted earlier, new density requirements are not
applied to existing development.
365
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users want to rebuild or renovate27 and non-conforming uses are only
gradually amortized away as improvements are made or an existing use has
been destroyed in a fire.28
In light of the practical difficulty, and political reluctance, that faces
efforts to set land use limits early in the development process,29 “fair share”
allocation of property inevitably gave way to a prior appropriation system.
Seen this way, late developers who are denied the opportunity to burden
such resources further can be seen as analogous to an aspirant water
appropriator who finds the stream or aquifer legally exhausted when he
seeks to draw on it. Of course there is an important difference: the water
system is explicit in adopting priority as the rule; whereas other systems are
not explicit about how they operate. Such systems thus generate unfairness
claims, though it does not take deep analysis to conclude that the system
has chosen to maximize private developmental initiatives at the expense of
early government-based land planning, and to favor existing uses and sunk
investment over after-the-fact reallocation.

IV.

Some (Rare) Examples of “Fair Share”

Prior appropriation has not invariably been the chosen system for
allocating property rights in resources. But other arrangements almost
always appear where some overarching authority can impose shared rights
at an early stage of development. One example is open space “fair sharing”
in a planned residential community, such as a large subdivision with a
condominium structure for common areas, and clustering of buildings to
preserve open space or habitat. A similar arrangement can be made for
density development, which is effectively what cities do when they grant
downzoned property transferable development rights.30
Another example of a “fair share” system is found within federal
reclamation projects, which build dams and reservoirs in order to provide
water for irrigation, municipal use and hydropower. Reclamation acquires
water rights under the prior appropriation system, but then contracts out

27. See GRANDFATHERING AND BUILDING CODES, http://www.cornerstoneinspection.com/grandfather.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
28.

MANDELKER, supra note 24, at §5.82.

29. Perhaps the most notable example was the failed effort some decades ago
to enact a national land use planning law. See Jayne E. Daly, A Glimpse of the Past, A
Vision for the Future: Senator Henry M. Jackson and National Land Use Legislation, 28 URBAN L.
J. 7 (1996). The Jackson bill was S. 3354, 91st Cong. (2d Sess. 1970).
30. E.g., Penn Central, supra note 3. However, as has often been noted, if TDRs
are granted relatively late in the developmental process, and all the property has
already been zoned, a TDR that grants enhanced density rights is effectively taking
something away from the owners in the transferee district.
366
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the water to users who have equal-in-priority rights inter se, so that in times
of shortage they are all cut back equally proportionately.31 Notably such
arrangements are imposed at the outset of development and under the
auspices of a single developer, the Bureau of Reclamation.
Two other examples of fair share also arise in the context of western
water law. The most notable large-scale case is the Colorado River.32 The
Colorado River Compact of 1922 and later arrangements rejected prior
appropriation and allocated a share of the river’s anticipated average flows
first by a division between the Upper Basin and Lower Basin states, and then
within each of the seven states that share the river.33 It also reserved an
unquantified amount of water to be allocated subsequently to Mexico,
which was done by Treaty in 1944.
For better and worse, that decision is a striking example of government
resource allocation based on a fair-share theory of entitlement. California’s
early development was repudiated as a basis for it to obtain the lion’s share
of the river. Nevada got a very small share of the water at a time when Las
Vegas was barely a hamlet—no one then imagined it would become one of
the nation’s fastest-growing urban areas. Even now, nearly a century later,
some Upper Basin states have not used their full share. California has had
to reduce its long-standing uses, Nevada has fallen short of its needs, and
Arizona has abundant water, some of which it stores up for the future. But
every state has its long-ago determined “fair share.”
Another notable example of “fair share” comes from California water
laws enacted in response to the massive dam and reservoir projects that
moved water from the abundant north to the arid and semi-arid south.
“Area of origin” laws are designed to permit later-developing communities in
source areas to reclaim water if and when they needed it.34 So far those laws
have had little impact on prior appropriators in the Central Valley and the

31. Use rights within the system can usually be marketed, adding further
flexibility to a shared-rights regime
32. NORRIS HUNDLEY, THE WEST AGAINST ITSELF: THE COLORADO RIVER—AN
INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, IN NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER: MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE
NEXT CENTURY 9 (Gary Weatherford & F. Lee Brown, eds., 1986). The Colorado River
documents are collected in KATHERINE OTT VERBURG, THE COLORADO RIVER DOCUMENTS
2008 (U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation Lower Colorado Region
(September 2010)).
33. The Upper Basin States are Colorado, Utah, Wyoming and New Mexico,
and the Lower Basin States are Arizona, California and Nevada.
34. Ronald B. Robie & Russell R. Kletzing, Area of Origin Statutes: The California
Experience, 15 IDAHO L.REV. 419 (1979).
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urbanized Los Angeles mega-region,35 though some areas of origin have
begun to assert their statutory rights.36
Notwithstanding these exceptions, the idea of “fair share” as a basis
for allocating resource capacity is very much at odds with the usual
American approach to property rights. Ironically, even the interstate
apportionment of rivers by the U.S. Supreme Court, which goes under the
seemingly “fair share” appellation of “equitable apportionment” is powerfully
dominated by respect for maintenance of existing uses at the expense of
newly proposed projects.37
The same is true of the ambient air, and the administration of our air
pollution laws. As limits were imposed on emissions, cutbacks of existing
uses were imposed in order to reach acceptable concentrations of
pollutants. In non-attainment areas, proposed new sources are required to
meet a higher standard (lowest achievable emission rate) and to more than
offset any emission increases their activity would create,38 which they can do
by shutting down some existing emitter. No historic non-emitter is entitled
to a fair share of the total extant emissions, but economic growth is
encouraged by allowing a market in emission reduction to operate.

V.

Conclusion

Insofar as regulation of later-developing owners in settings like Agins
seems unfair, such outcomes are generated by our first-come, first-served,
prior appropriation system. The problem is not that a regulated owner never
had any property interest in the resource in question. Nor is it that some
entitlement unique to him has been taken away by the government. It is
rather that there is nothing left when he comes to use some of it.
If the total resource—let us say it was 100 open space use units—had
been equally divided among ten landowners (with each having a right to buy
or sell allotments), and at some later date the city had limited total open
space utilization to ninety units, few if any courts would treat that late-stage
restriction as a taking, even if open space regulation was quite a new thing.
That being the case, whatever sense of unfairness open space ordinances
generate in Agins-type cases would seem to derive not from the restriction
itself, but from the way in which those use-units were allocated.

35.

See THOMPSON, ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 242 (5th ed. 2013).

36. E.g., Tehama-Colusa Canal Auth. v. Dept. of the Interior, 819 F. Supp. 2d
956 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
37. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico (II), 467 U.S. 310 (1984); but the Court
says priority should not be strictly applied where it would work hardship, Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 619 (1945).
38.
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Many observers see no unfairness even under the present system,
believing that owners in a ‘race to the swift’ system should be prepared for
unpredictable changes, and that even extreme losses call for no
compensation. But that is not the way takings law has developed. While
Justice Antonin Scalia is the most prominent contemporary advocate of a
diminution of value test to measure compensability,39 he is not alone.
Justice Holmes also said that regulation, if too onerous, might qualify as a
compensable taking.40 Thus, while “fair share” has never functioned as the
constitutional standard, economic loss has served as an indicator for some
broader notion of fairness courts are seeking in takings cases.41
Since most regulated parties in Agins-like downzoning situations do
not prevail in their takings claims unless their economic loss is very
extensive, a reasonable conclusion is that courts have tacitly acknowledged
the first-in-time system as a defense to a takings claim so long as the loss is
not too severe. While basing compensation on diminution of value is
plainly not a satisfactory theoretical basis for a constitutional standard,42
there may be another explanation for judicial attention to the extent of
economic loss.
Courts recognize that our prior appropriation system can produce
inequitable outcomes for some late-stage developers subject to newly
enacted restrictions. That being the case, compensating only those whose
losses have been quite severe, and giving weight to other ‘soft’ factors like
the unexpectedness of regulation for some activity,43 the lack of opportunity
to take adaptive measures, and the absence of conduct wrongful in itself;

39.

See supra note 12.

40. Though Holmes rarely decided cases on that basis. See Joseph L. Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36, 43 (1964).
41.

See supra note 4.

42. If 100% loss is compensable, why not 95%, and if 95%, why not 75% or 55%?
See Justice Scalia’s observation in Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, n.8. The same dilemma
arises under the diminution element of the Penn Central tripartite standard.
43. An interesting empirical question is whether owners who are more or less
surprised by a newly enacted standard are more likely to get compensation than
those who arguably ought to have seen it coming, even though the specific
restriction was only recently specifically applied to them. For example, wetlands
regulations discouraging the use of such lands have been around for more than four
decades, even though the detailed rules keep changing. By contrast open space
zoning was quite new when the Agins case first arose, and the prior practice had been
for government to buy open space easements. Indeed, there were efforts to do so in
Tiburon prior to the downzoning. See generally, James C.N. Paul & Jan Z. Krasnowiecki,
The Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA. L.REV. 179 (1961).
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might provide the basis for something we could describe as compassionate
constitutionalism; not “fair share,” but fairness as a kind of rough justice.
In light of the decades-long and fruitless search for doctrinal solutions
to the takings issue both by courts and scholars, the time might be ripe for
transition to an openly situational approach to the problem. The rather
fuzzy tripartite Penn Central standard44 is quite amenable to use for this
purpose, with a more or less implicit recognition that the question is
whether the claimant has been hit so hard, and with so little warning, or
opportunity to adapt or adjust, that denying compensation seems unfair.
Under such an approach, it may well turn out that the ‘widows and orphans’
type cases that property rights advocates are so fond of ferreting out would
do quite well, while the complaints of large-scale and sophisticated
developers would usually fare poorly. Maybe that wouldn’t be such a bad
way of doling out fairness in the property realm.

44.
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See supra note 12.

